IN
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No.
99-20686
_____________________
SIMI
INVESTMENT COMPANY INC
Plaintiff
- Appellee
v.
HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS
Defendant
- Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal
from the United States District Court
for
the Southern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
June
28, 2001
Before
KING, Chief Judge, and REYNALDO G. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges. OPINION ON
PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (Opinion December 21, 2000 (5th Cir. 2000) 236
F.3d 240)
PER
CURIAM:
Treating
the Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a Petition for Panel Rehearing, the
Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel nor judge in
regular active service of the court having requested that the court be polled
on Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. and 5th Cir. R. 35), the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
We
take this opportunity to address the concern expressed by Harris County as to
the scope of the substantive due process holding in this case. In John Corp. v.
City of Houston, this court stated that "a careful analysis must be
undertaken to assess the extent to which a plaintiff's substantive due process
claim rests on protections that are also afforded by the Takings Clause."
214 F.3d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 2000). In the majority of cases involving landowner
complaints, substantive due process is not the appropriate avenue of relief.
Our Takings Clause jurisprudence cannot be circumvented by artful pleading of
substantive due process claims. Except in the rare cases of deprivations of
property based on, for example, illegitimate and arbitrary governmental
abuse,(1) vague statutes,(2) or retroactive statutes,(3) the takings analysis
established by the Supreme Court and this circuit should control constitutional
violations involving property rights that have been infringed by governmental
action.(4)
1. See Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, Tex., 236 F.3d 240, 249 (5th Cir. 2000); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1995).
2.
See John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 585 (5th Cir. 2000).
3.
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
provision of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. §
9706. See 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998). The Court split 4-1-4, with five Justices
concluding that a substantive due process analysis, and not a Takings Clause
analysis, should be used to determine the constitutionality of the statute,
which had retroactive effect. See id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part ) (determining that "the case is controlled
not by the Takings Clause but by well-settled due process principles respecting
retroactive laws."); see id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with Justice Kennedy and stating "at the heart of the [Takings] Clause
lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but
with providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes
'private property' to serve the 'public' good.").
4.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, --- S. Ct. ----, 2001 WL 721005 ( June 28,
2001); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186-94 (1985); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978); Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925,
936-37 (5th Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 386-88 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).