PATTERSON v. McLEAN CREDIT UNION, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)

In this respect, it prohibits discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to existing practices. It also covers wholly private efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination by private entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing the terms of a contract. Following this principle and consistent with our holding in Runyon that 1981 applies to private conduct, we have held that certain private entities such as labor unions, which bear explicit responsibilities to process grievances, press claims, and represent member in disputes over the terms of binding obligations that run from the employer to the employee, are subject to liability under 1981 for racial discrimination in the enforcement of labor contracts. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The right to enforce contracts does not, however, extend beyond conduct by an employer which impairs an employee's ability [491 U.S. 164, 178]   to enforce through legal process his or her established contract rights. As JUSTICE WHITE put it with much force in Runyon, one cannot seriously "contend that the grant of the other rights enumerated in 1981, [that is, other than the right to "make" contracts,] i. e., the rights `to sue, be parties, give evidence,' and `enforce contracts' accomplishes anything other than the removal of legal disabilities to sue, be a party, testify or enforce a contract. Indeed, it is impossible to give such language any other meaning." 427 U.S., at 195 , n. 5 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).

Where conduct is covered by both 1981 and Title VII, the detailed procedures of Title VII are rendered a dead letter, as the plaintiff is free to pursue a claim by bringing suit under 1981 without resort to those statutory prerequisites.

By reading 1981 not as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, but as limited to the enumerated rights within its express protection, specifically the right to make and enforce contracts, we may preserve the integrity of Title VII's procedures without sacrificing [491 U.S. 164, 182]   any significant coverage of the civil rights laws.