No allegations of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus are required to establish a cause of action under the first part of 1985(2). The statutory provisions now codified at 1985 were originally enacted as 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act has not been changed.

Although 2 contained only one long paragraph when it was originally enacted, that single paragraph outlawed five broad classes of conspiratorial activity. In general terms, 2 proscribed conspiracies that interfere with (a) the performance of official duties by federal officers; (b) the administration of justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in state courts; (d) the private enjoyment of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; and (e) the right to support candidates in federal elections. As now codified in 1985, the long paragraph is divided into three subsections. One of the five classes of prohibited conspiracy is proscribed by 1985(1), two by 1985(2), and two by 1985(3). The civil remedy for a violation of any of the subsections is found at the end of 1985(3). The reclassification was not intended to change the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act. 6  

Neither proponents nor opponents of the bill had any doubt that the Constitution gave Congress the power to prohibit intimidation of parties, witnesses, and jurors in federal courts. 10  

Section 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis supplied).

 Bray v Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S Ct 753(1993)

Our precedents establish that in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of the first clause of § 1985(3), ^[n.1] a plaintiff must show, inter alia, (1) that-some racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and (2) that the conspiracy "aimed at interfering with rights" that are "protected against private, as well as official, encroachment," Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). We think neither showing has been made in the present case.

In Griffin this Court held, reversing a 20 year old precedent, see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that § 1985(3) reaches not only conspiracies under color of state law, but also purely private conspiracies.

A § 1985(3) private conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws," requires an intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment. See Carpenters, 463 U. S., at 833. No intent to deprive of such a right was established here.

Our discussion in Carpenters makes clear that it does not suffice for application of § 1985(3) that a protected right be incidentally affected. A conspiracy is not "for the purpose" of denying equal protection simply because it has an effect upon a protected right. The right must be "aimed at," 463 U. S., at 833 (emphasis added); its impairment must be a conscious objective of the enterprise. Just as the "invidiously discriminatory animus" requirement, discussed above, requires that the defendant have taken his action "at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group," Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279, so also the "intent to deprive of a right" requirement demands that the defendant do more than merely be aware of a deprivation of right that he causes, and more than merely accept it; he must act at least in part for the very purpose of producing it. ^[n.6]

1 Section 1985(3) provides as follows:

"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against one or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

[December 14, 1998]

    Section 1985(2), in relevant part, proscribes conspiracies to "deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified."¹ The statute provides that if one or more persons engaged in such a conspiracy "do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, . . . the party so injured … may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury … against any one or more of the conspirators." §1985(3). ²

We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that petitioner must suffer an injury to a "constitutionally protected property interest" to state a claim for damages under §1985(2). Nothing in the language or purpose of the proscriptions in the first clause of §1985(2), nor in its attendant remedial provisions, establishes such a requirement. The gist of the wrong at which §1985(2) is directed is not deprivation of property, but intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings. The terms "injured in his person or property" define the harm that the victim may suffer as a result of the conspiracy to intimidate or retaliate. Thus, the fact that employment at will is not "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345—347 (1976), does not mean that loss of at-will employment may not "injur[e] [petitioner] in his person or property" for purposes of §1985(2).

    We hold that the sort of harm alleged by petitioner here–essentially third-party interference with at-will employment relationships–states a claim for relief under §1985(2). Such harm has long been a compensable injury under tort law, and we see no reason to ignore this tradition in this case. As Thomas Cooley recognized:

"One who maliciously and without justifiable cause, induces an employer to discharge an employee, by means of false statements, threats or putting in fear, or perhaps by means of malevolent advice and persuasion, is liable in an action of tort to the employee for the damages thereby sustained. And it makes no difference whether the employment was for a fixed term not yet expired or is terminable at the will of the employer." 2 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 589—91 (3d ed. 1906) (emphasis added).

The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §766, Comment g, pp.10—11 (1977); see also id., §766B, Comment c, at 22. This protection against third-party interference with at-will employment relations is still afforded by state law today. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keaton on Law of Torts §129, pp. 995—996, and n. 83 (5th ed. 1984) (citing cases). For example, the State of Georgia, where the acts underlying the complaint in this case took place, provides a cause of action against third parties for wrongful interference with employment relations. See Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S. E. 2d 442, 444 (1978) ("[E]ven though a person’s employment contract is at will, he has a valuable contract right which may not be unlawfully interfered with by a third person"); see also Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 763, 766—769, 320 S. E. 2d 872, 877—879 (1984) (directed verdict inappropriate against defendant who procured plaintiff’s termination for failure to lie at a deposition hearing).⁴ Thus, to the extent that the terms "injured in his person or property" in §1985 refer to principles of tort law, see 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 118 (1768) (describing the universe of common law torts as "all private wrongs, or civil injuries, which may be offered to the rights of either a man’s person or his property"), we find ample support for our holding that the harm occasioned by the conspiracy here may give rise to a claim for damages under §1985(2).

1.  Section 1985(2) proscribes the following conspiracies: "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws."

2.  Section 1985(3) contains the remedial provision granting a cause of action for damages to those harmed by any of the conspiracies prohibited in §1985. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724—725 (1983) (listing the various conspiracies that §1985 prohibits).