Respondent was a white mail who claimed defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to intimidate and threaten various potential material witnesses in order to prevent them from testifying "freely, fully and truthfully" in the action, in violation of the first part of 42 U.S.C. 1985(2) (1976 ed., Supp.V).

The Supreme Court held that No allegations of racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus are required to establish a cause of action under the first part of the 1985(2). "Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of class-based animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their rights under the first part of 1985(2). The legislative history supports this conclusion. Pp. 724-727." And "Given the structure of 2 of the 1871 Act, it is clear that Congress did not intend to impose a requirement of class-based animus on persons seeking to prove a violation of their rights under the first clause of 1985(2)." KUSH v. RUTLEDGE, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) 460 U.S. 719

The statutory provisions now codified at 1985 were originally enacted as 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act has not been changed.

Although 2 contained only one long paragraph when it was originally enacted, that single paragraph outlawed five broad classes of conspiratorial activity. In general terms, 2 proscribed conspiracies that interfere with (a) the performance of official duties by federal officers; (b) the administration of justice in federal courts; (c) the administration of justice in state courts; (d) the private enjoyment of "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; and (e) the right to support candidates in federal elections. As now codified in 1985, the long paragraph is divided into three subsections. One of the five classes of prohibited conspiracy is proscribed by 1985(1), two by 1985(2), and two by 1985(3). The civil remedy for a violation of any of the subsections is found at the end of 1985(3). The reclassification was not intended to change the substantive meaning of the 1871 Act. 6  

Three of the five broad categories, the first two and the fifth, relate to institutions and processes of the Federal Government - federal officers, 1985(1); federal judicial proceedings, the first portion of 1985(2); and federal elections, the second part of 1985(3). The statutory provisions dealing [460 U.S. 719, 725]   with these categories of conspiratorial activity contain no language requiring that the conspirators act with intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws. Nor was such language found in the corresponding portions of 2 of the 1871 Act. See Appendix to this opinion. 7  

The remaining two categories, however, encompass underlying activity that is not institutionally linked to federal interests and that is usually of primary state concern. The second part of 1985(2) applies to conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts, and the first part of 1985(3) provides a cause of action against two or more persons who "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another." 8 Each of these portions of the statute contains language requiring that the conspirators' actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws.

    Michale A. Haddle, an at-will employee, alleges that respondents conspiredto have him fired from his job in retaliation for, and to deter him from, testifying at a criminal trial.

asserting a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and various state-law claims. Petitioner stated two grounds for relief under §1985(2): one for conspiracy to deter him from testifying in the upcoming criminal trial and one for conspiracy to retaliate against him for attending the grand jury proceedings. As §1985 demands, he also alleged that he had been "injured in his person or property" by the acts of respondents in violation of §1985(2) and that he was entitled to recover his damages occasioned by such injury against respondents jointly and severally.

Section 1985(2), in relevant part, proscribes conspiracies to "deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified."¹ The statute provides that if one or more persons engaged in such a conspiracy "do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, . . . the party so injured … may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury … against any one or more of the conspirators." §1985(3). ²

The gist of the wrong at which §1985(2) is directed is not deprivation of property, but intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings. The terms "injured in his person or property" define the harm that the victim may suffer as a result of the conspiracy to intimidate or retaliate. Thus, the fact that employment at will is not "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345—347 (1976), does not mean that loss of at-will employment may not "injur[e] [petitioner] in his person or property" for purposes of §1985(2).

We hold that the sort of harm alleged by petitioner here–essentially third-party interference with at-will employment relationships–states a claim for relief under §1985(2). Such harm has long been a compensable injury under tort law, and we see no reason to ignore this tradition in this case

"One who maliciously and without justifiable cause, induces an employer to discharge an employee, by means of false statements, threats or putting in fear, or perhaps by means of malevolent advice and persuasion, is liable in an action of tort to the employee for the damages thereby sustained. And it makes no difference whether the employment was for a fixed term not yet expired or is terminable at the will of the employer." 2 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 589—91 (3d ed. 1906) (emphasis added).

The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §766, Comment g, pp.10—11 (1977); see also id., §766B, Comment c, at 22. This protection against third-party interference with at-will employment relations is still afforded by state law today. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keaton on Law of Torts §129, pp. 995—996, and n. 83 (5th ed. 1984) (citing cases). I need to add here citings of Texas Cases

In Griffin this Court held, reversing a 20 year old precedent, see Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that § 1985(3) reaches not only conspiracies under color of state law, but also purely private conspiracies.    

Respondents, like the courts below, rely upon the right to interstate travel--which we have held to be, in at least some contexts, a right constitutionally protected against private interference. See Griffin, supra, at 105-106.

"[A] conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate § 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then . . . the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). ^[n.5]

The federal guarantee of interstate travel does not transform state law torts into federal offenses when they are intentionally committed against interstate travelers. Rather, it protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: "the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement" and "being treated differently" from intrastate travelers. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60, n. 6 (1982).